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Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal:
A Rule Ripe for Reexamination
Joseph P. Bauer *

Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1 proscribes "[e]very contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade." Early Supreme Court cases
interpreting this provision held that it required a determination by the trier
of fact of the "reasonableness" of the challenged conduct in each case-an
approach which came to be known as the "rule of reason." 2 In subsequent
cases, however, the Court has held that certain conduct is unreasonable per
se.3 That is, once a court has determined that such conduct has taken place,
it is foreclosed from undertaking an inquiry into the reasonableness of that
conduct. 4 One form of activity that has been declared unreasonable per se
is the group boycott, or concerted refusal to deal.5 Recently, this particular
doctrine has been the subject of much concern and criticism by lower federal
courts 6 and commentators. 7 Although many courts adhere unquestioningly
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame University. B.A. 1965, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1969, Harvard University.

1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
2. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); United States v.

American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911).
3. In addition to concerted refusals to deal, see note 5 infra, other forms of conduct that
the Supreme Court has held to be unreasonable per se include: horizontal price restraints,
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927); vertical price restraints, Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968);
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); horizontal territorial and customer
restraints, United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); vertical territorial and customer restraints, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), overruled by
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); and tying arrangements,
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
4. Thus, a court's initial task is to characterize the conduct. If the actions fit within
the definition of the universally proscribed conduct, they are deemed unlawful without further
investigation. If they do not, the court will evaluate the conduct under the rule of reason.
See notes 43-49 and accompanying text infra.
5. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). See also notes
12-42 and accompanying text infra. As the terms are used in this Article, a group boycott
or concerted refusal to deal is an agreement by two or more parties that at least one party
thereto will undertake either to threaten or in fact not to buy from, sell to, or in some other
respect deal with some person not a party to the agreement. "Person" is used here in
the same sense as it is defined in § 8 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1976), to include
corporations and associations as well as living individuals. The refusal to deal includes within
its scope not only the absolute refusal to buy or sell, but also the refusal to deal except
at higher prices or on more onerous terms. Professor Sullivan argties that the term "concerted refusal to deal" may be either too broad or too narrow to describe the conduct
covered by the per se rule. He therefore prefers the term "boycott," although it admittedly
has emotional content. L. SuiLuvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAV OF AN~rrRUsr 231-32 (1977).
This Article will adopt the more common practice of using these two terms interchangeably.
6. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 46-48 infra.
7. See Horsley, Per Se Illegality and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 13 B.C. INDus. & COM.
L. REv. 484 (1972); McCormick, Group Boycotts-Per Se or Not Per Se, That is the Question, 7 SrroN HALL L. Rnv. 703 (1976); Woolley, Is a Boycott a Per Se Violation of the
Antitrust Laws?, 27 RuTGERs L. Rnv. 773 (1974); Comment, Boycott: A Specific Definition
Limits the Applicability of a Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U.L. Rav. 818 (1977); Comment, A Reexamination of the Boycott Per Se Rule in Antitrust Law, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 126 (1974); 42
U. COLO.L. REv. 467 (1971).
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to this per se rule, others have either found the doctrine inapplicable to the
facts at bar or resorted to limiting a rule upon which the Supreme Court
has placed no limitations. As a result, the present state of the law reflects
much confusion.
Recently, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.8 the Supreme Court took a step unprecedented in at least the last sixty-five years
of antitrust jurisprudence-it overturned a per se rule which had outlawed
all vertical territorial and customer restraints in which the buyer acquired
title to the goods, and reinstated a rule of reason analysis for this type of
conduct. One of the rationales given by the Sylvania Court for rejecting a
per se approach was the frequent criticism the old rule-the Schwinn doctrine--had received both in the literature and in the lower courts 10
The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated its adherence to the per se
rule respecting group boycotts." Yet, in view of the recent treatment this
rule has received in the courts and in the law journals, the Sylvania decision
gives reason to believe that this particular doctrine might also be the subject
of reexamination and possible modification.
This Article will first explore the development of the rule holding concerted refusals to deal unreasonable per se and the justification for such an
approach. It will then consider why many courts and commentators are
dissatisfied with the present approach and will discuss how lower federal
courts have avoided using it. Finally, the Article suggests that criticism of
the per se rule is justified, and proposes a partial return to a rule of reason
analysis, with carefully defined criteria for testing legality and a more
narrowly circumscribed per se rule.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Supreme Court Development of the Per Se Rule
In Montague & Co. v. Lowry,12 a 1904 case, the Supreme Court first
held that a concerted refusal to deal violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.
An association of wholesalers and manufacturers was formed under which
manufacturers who sold to nonmembers would be expelled from the association. Several competing nonmember dealers were thereby precluded
from purchasing directly from their former suppliers; instead, they were
8. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). See generally Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis ol
Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
9. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (vertical territorial and
customer restraints on the sale of goods, where the title to the goods passes to the buyer, are
illegal per se).
10. 433 U.S. at 48 & nn. 13 & 14.
11. See cases cited in note 35 infra.
12. 193 U.S. 38 (1904). Allegations of concerted refusals to deal had been made in two
earlier cases, but neither decision was on the merits. Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S.
604 (1898) (restraint held not to violate Sherman Act because effect on commerce was "but
indirect and incidental"); Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898) (Sherman Act held
inapplicable because conduct did not affect interstate commerce).
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forced to buy from the wholesaler-members at a greatly increased price. 13
Although the Court's decision contained almost no indication of the standard
that was applied, it held that the "agreement directly affected and restrained
interstate commerce" 14 and therefore was unlawful.
Ten years later, in Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association
v. United States,15 the Court held another concerted refusal to deal unlawful.
A group of retailers had implicitly agreed not to buy from wholesalers who
sold directly to customers. The Court noted that each dealer had the right,
acting individually, to choose whether or not to do business with any particular seller-that is, unilaterally to refuse to deal. It explained that the
evil of a group boycott arose from the use of the combined market strength
of the group to coerce the wholesaler to conform to the desired conduct. 16
The Court also noted that the conduct would not have been saved even if
the parties had been seeking to promote either the welfare of their industry
or what they perceived to be the public welfare; the Sherman Act, it asserted,
simply does not permit private traders to use their joint buying and selling
power to make this judgment.' 7
The first suggestion that a per se rule might apply to group boycotts 18
appeared in ParamountFamous Lasky Corp. v. United States.'9 In that case,
ten producer-distributors controlling a large portion of the motion picture
business agreed to require of all exhibitors a standard exhibition contract,
which included a provision for arbitration of any disputes and required an
exhibitor to post a security deposit if it refused to enter into arbitration or
later refused to comply with an arbitration award. This refusal of an
exhibitor in a dispute with any one producer-distributor resulted in a suspension of service from all ten. In effect, the joint market power of the
producer-distributors-the ability to cut off an exhibitor from the supply of
the majority of motion picture films-was used to coerce the exhibitors to
adhere to the contractual provisions with each individual distributor.
In response to the allegations that this arrangement violated section 1
of the Sherman Act, the defendants asserted that the agreements were reasonable in view of the needs of the industry. These self-help mechanisms,
they asserted, were one of the few effective ways for companies to learn
about the reliability of buyers. The Supreme Court, applying the rule of
13. Here, the group boycott was a joint refusal to sell to the plaintiffs-an absolute
refusal by the manufacturer-members and a conditional refusal (only at dramatically higher
prices) by the wholesaler-members.
14. 193 U.S. at 48.
15. 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
16. Id. at 611-12.
17. Id. at 613.
18. In the period between Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n and Paramount, the

Court passed upon concerted refusals to deal in three cases: Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) (concerted refusals to work by members of labor organizations); Binderup v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923) (joint
refusal by distributors of motion pictures to license exhibitor); Duplex Printing Press Co. v.
Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) (secondary boycott by labor organizers).
19. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
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reason, concluded that the agreements suppressed normal competitive processes and were unlawful.2 0
The decision, however, is more significant for its omissions. Three
years earlier the Court, in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,-' had held
that certain kinds of conduct-in that case, price-fixing-were unreasonable
per se. The Court in Paramount did not discuss whether the per se rule
should be extended to include concerted refusals to deal; its decision, however, is difficult to justify solely under the rule of reason. There was
virtually no discussion of the nature of the injury, either to the parties or
to the public, of how competition would be affected, or even of why the
practice was "unreasonable." In short, the Court was unwilling to consider
the potential benefits of these agreements.
Further advances toward institution of the per se rule for concerted
refusals to deal were made in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc.
v. FTC.22 The defendants, designers and manufacturers of women's garments and the manufacturers of textiles used in the production of these
garments, were upset because certain of their competitors, branded "style
pirates," were copying their fabrics and clothes without authorization and
selling them at a lower price. The defendants, acting through the Guild,
instituted a joint protective program; the garment manufacturers agreed not
to sell to stores that sold a "pirate's" garments, and the textile manufacturers agreed not to sell to any dress manufacturer which subsequently sold
to stores selling "pirate" goods.
The defendants argued that this boycott program was necessary to
protect them from unfair business practices-unauthorized copying-for
which they had an inadequate remedy under state tort law; therefore, the
program was assertedly a reasonable method of joint self-help. The Court
declined to weigh these asserted benefits against the costs to competitors
and consumers; instead, it suggested that an examination of the reasonableness of the agreement was irrelevant: "Under these circumstances, .. .
the reasonableness of the methods pursued by the combination to accomplish
its unlawful object is no more material than would be the reasonableness
of the prices fixed by unlawful combination." 23 The Court never explained
why it might not be appropriate, at least in some cases, to make the balancing inquiry of the rule of reason when evaluating concerted refusals
to deal. 24
20. Id. at 43.
21. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
22. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
23. Id. at 468. The circumstances to which the Court apparently referred are "(tiho
purpose and object of this combination, its potential power, its tendency to monopoly,
[and] the coercion it could and did practice upon a rival method of competition . .. ."
Id. at 467. It is arguable that the Court's "per se" rule would not have applied had these
circumstances not been present. See also Millinery Creator's Guild, Inc. v. FTC, 312
U.S. 469 (1941).
24. The Court did indicate why the defendants' conduct ran counter to the policy of the
Sherman Act: "[lit narrows the outlets to which garment and textile manufacturers can sell
and the sources from which retailers can buy ... ; [it] subjects all retailers and manufacturers
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In Associated Press v. United States,25 defendants were newspapers that
had organized the preeminent news wire service in the country. The
organization had adopted by-laws which restricted dissemination and sales
of the gathered news to other association members and gave member newspapers virtual veto power to block membership applications by nonmembers
who were potential competitors. In addition to the monopoly-perpetuating
characteristics of these practices, which led to a challenge under section 2
of the Sherman Act, the joint refusal to sell news to nonmembers or to
allow them to join the organization was challenged by the Government as
a group boycott, illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court held
that the agreement of these competitors to deal with each other, but not
with any other competitor, was unlawful. The Court stressed that the agreement made it harder for the outsiders to compete, by making it more difficult
and expensive for them to gather news, and raised barriers to entry for
would-be competitors. 26 Although the Court found that the defendants'
motive in instituting these rules was to prevent competition, it went on to
say that even good motives would not have saved this otherwise illegal
combination. 27 Nonetheless, the opinion again failed to use the "per se"
language, and it provided no reason why examination of motives and effect
28
should be foreclosed in all cases.
Any doubt as to whether the Supreme Court had adopted a per se rule
for group boycotts was erased by the decision in Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc. 29 Broadway-Hale, a retailer of appliances in San Franwho decline to comply with the Guild's program to an organized boycott . . . ; [it] takes
away the freedom of action of members by requiring each to reveal to the Guild the intimate
details of their individual affairs . . .; and [it] has both as its necessary tendency and as its
purpose and effect the direct suppression of competition from the sale of unregistered textiles
and copied designs .... ." 312 U.S. at 465.
25. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
26. Id. at 9, 13.
27. Id. at 16 n.15.
28. It is arguable that Associated Press does not involve a concerted refusal to deal, but
rather imposes a duty on those with control of a unique asset to deal with the public on
nondiscriminatory terms. See United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
Compare 326 U.S. at 19 (Black, J.)with id. at 25 (Douglas, J.,concurring) and id. at 55
(Murphy, I., dissenting). See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 348-49 n.5 (1963); Gamco, Inc. v.
Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 487-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 817 (1952); American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers, Inc. v. Neal, 183 F.2d 869 (4th
Cir. 1950). Cf. Athletes Foot, Inc. v. Ralph Libonati Co., 445 F. Supp. 35, 50 (D. Del. 1977)
(manufacturer of unique trademarked product, integral to retailer's business, may be under
duty to sell). But see L. SurLI.Va, supra note 5, at 253-55.
29. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
In the period between the Associated Press and Klor's decisions, in at least four cases
dealing with other aspects of the antitrust laws, the Court reiterated the principle that all
inquiries into the reasonableness of this conduct were foreclosed. In United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the Court for the first time used the term "per se" in connection with group boycotts. Columbia Steel was an action attacking a horizontal merger under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. In the course of a discussion of several kinds of otherwise reasonable restraints which might become unreasonable in light of the intent of the parties, the
Court listed some forms of conduct that would be illegal per se: "For example, where a
complaint charges that the defendants have engaged in price fixing, or have concertedly refused
to deal with non-members of an association, . . . then the amount of commerce involved is
immaterial because such restraints are illegal per se." Id. at 522-23 (emphasis added). The
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cisco, apparently was disturbed by plaintiff Klors' price-cutting techniques.80
It approached several appliance manufacturers who were suppliers to both
parties, demanding that they either not sell to Kor's at all or sell to it
only at discriminatorily high prices. After these manufacturers acceded to
Broadway-Hale's demand, plaintiff sued, charging that their joint refusal to
sell to it constituted an illegal group boycott. The defendants asserted that
there had been no public injury, since there were hundreds of stores in San
Francisco selling the manufacturers' products even after their refusal to sell
to plaintiff; they further asserted that their conduct was reasonable, since it
had no effect on the price, quality, or quantity of goods available. The Court
rejected these arguments, holding that a group boycott would always be
condemned, regardless of actual effect:
Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with
other traders, have long been held to be in the forbidden category.
They have not been saved by allegations that they were reasonable
in the specific circumstances . . . . Even when they operated to
lower prices or temporarily to stimulate competition they were
banned. 3 '
The Court's opinion did point to some of the evils that flowed from
this particular restraint: it deprived Klor's of the right to buy the appliances,
eventually driving it out of business; it deprived the sellers of the freedom
to sell to Klor's (although this was a right they had voluntarily forsaken
and could have recaptured any time they chose); and it had the "tendency
toward monopoly," because of the possibility of slowly but steadily driving
out of business small companies like Klor's.3 2 Yet, the Court still did not
indicate why an inquiry into the defendant's motives and the effect of the
conduct on competition should always be foreclosed. In short, there was
no analysis of why all gro p boycotts deserve per se treatment.88
The next case decided by the Court under the group boycott doctrine
was RadiantBurners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.8 4 The plaintiff,
Court used similar dictum, restating the per se illegality of group boycotts, in a case attacking
a horizontal agreement to set maximum resale prices---Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph B.
Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951)-and in two cases challenging tying arrangements--Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953), and
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Notwithstanding these apparently explicit statements, a number of lower courts in the
1950's took the view that these Supreme Court pronouncements were merely suggestive and
continued to deal with boycott cases under the rule of reason. See the cases cited in Handler,
Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1958-1959, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 843, 862 (1959), and
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rev. 847 (1955)
See also 70 HA~sv. L. Rev. 1113 (1957).
30. See note 118 and accompanying text infra.
31. 359 U.S. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
32. In addition, the boycott of Klor's served as a message to other retailers that if they
were to engage in price-cutting, they would risk being cut off by their suppliers. Thus, the
boycott had an anticompetitive effect beyond any damage to Klor's itself.
33. See Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on

the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. Rev. 1165, 1167 (1959).
34. 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam).
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Radiant, had developed a gas burner for use in commercial and residential
heating. In order to assure the safe use of natural gas, a number of gas
utilities, gas pipeline companies, and manufacturers of gas appliances had
formed an association to test and approve all gas appliances. The utilitymembers agreed that they would not supply natural gas to retail customers
who intended to use it in connection with unapproved appliances. After
the association refused plaintiff its seal of approval, Radiant claimed that
the standards were set and applied arbitrarily to prevent it from competing
with the manufacturer-members. It sued under section I of the Sherman
Act, asserting that the refusal to certify and the refusal to sell gas to its
prospective customers were an unlawful concerted refusal to deal. The Court
reversed the trial court's grant of the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a trial to attempt to
prove its allegations.
In its brief decision, the Court cited Kor's extensively, repeating the
principle that concerted refusals to deal are uniformly forbidden. The case,
however, presents novel problems which the Court did not adequately
address. Up through Klor's there was a common factual thread running
through the group boycott cases: the courts in each case could reasonably
have inferred an intent to injure the third party. Radiant Burners stretches
this thread. Presumably, the Court was not saying that the seal must be
given, and the gas sold, even if the appliance were defective or dangerous.
Rather, the Court must have intended that it would always be unreasonable
to discriminate against the plaintiff, if its appliance were otherwise safe.
That is, an arbitrary denial of the seal of approval, without giving the
plaintiff an opportunity to show either that its burner met the defendants'
standards, or that those standards were unreasonable, would be unlawful
per se.
Over the past dozen years, the Supreme Court, in a number of decisions, has reaffirmed the principle that group boycotts are unreasonable
per se.85 In its most recent decision involving group boycotts, St. Paul Fire
35. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966). A "location
clause" in the franchise agreement between General Motors and its dealers permitted GM to
prevent the dealer from opening a showroom too close to another dealer. Chevrolet dealers in
the Los Angeles area pressured GM to threaten to terminate the franchises of several dealers
who were selling to discount houses, ostensibly because they violated the location clause. The
Court found a conspiracy among the dealers, and between them and GM, to coerce competitors
to conform or risk being driven out of business. The Court indicated that this conduct was
unreasonable per se.
See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); United States v. National
Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729 (1975); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1968); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350, 357 n.5 (1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259-60, 263 (1963);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 708 (1962). Similar
statements also appeared in Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 314 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 287 & n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (Douglas, 3.)
(application for stay in chambers); and United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393

U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dissenting).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:685

& Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry,30 the Supreme Court hinted that it might
be prepared to reexamine the scope of the per se rule. At issue in St. Paul
was the extent of the exemption from the antitrust laws conferred on insurance companies by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.37 The Court was called
upon to decide whether the term "boycott," as used in section 3 (b) of the

McCarran-Ferguson Act, had "its ordinary Sherman Act meaning as 'a
concerted refusal to deal,'" 38 or was limited to boycotts by insurance companies of othef companies or their agents. Although the Court opted for
the former, broader definition, Justice Powell's opinion for the Court 80 may
prove significant for another reason-it may foreshadow a change in the
strict per se approach to group boycotts. After first reviewing the legislative
history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the opinion discussed some early
group boycott cases and pointed out the different terminology which had
been used to describe this particular conduct. It went on to note, in a
passage that was clearly unnecessary for determination of the statutory
construction issue, that there is some controversy as to what conduct comes
within the per se rule.40 Then Justice Powell said: "But the issue before
us is whether the conduct in question involves a boycott, not whether it is
per se unreasonable." 41
Although it would be an exaggeration to assert that this is a clear
indication that the Court is willing to reconsider the per se rule, the Sylvania
case42 suggests that such a change is not nearly as unlikely as it would have
been even as recently as 1973.
B.

Lower Court Reaction to the Supreme Court Rule

The per se rule enunciated by the Supreme Court has created a number
of problems in application for the lower courts. One problem has been
defining what constitutes a group boycott.43 Although experience may allow
36. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976).

38. 438 U.S. at 540. This definition of group boycott would have included within tho
unexempted conduct concerted refusals to deal with customers as well as with competitors of
the insurance companies.
39. Justice Powell was joined by six other members of the Court. Justice Stewart wrote
a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
40. "Petitioners ... cite commentary that attempts to develop a test for distinguishing the
types of restraints that warrant per se invalidation from other concerted refusals to deal
that are not inherently destructive of competition." 438 U.S. at 542. After citing and summarizing a few of these approaches, the Court said: "We express no opinion, however, as to the
merit of any of these definitions." Id. n.14.
41. Id. The Court also quoted Professor Areeda for the proposition that "'Boycotts are
not a unitary phenomenon."' Id. at 543 (quoting P. ANxEDA, ANTiTRusr ANALYSis 381
(2d ed. 1974)).
42. Justice Powell was also the author of Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977)-the first (and only) decision to overrule a per se rule.
43. See, e.g., International Rys. of Cent. America v. United Brands Co., 532 F.2d 231
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976). The two defendants had been the principal
customers of the plaintiff railroad. They made a joint decision, based on independent business
considerations, to close down their Guatemalan banana plantations. This joint determination
obviously meant that neither defendant would continue to do business with the plaintiff;
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us quickly to include certain conduct within this term, most situations
are far more ambiguous. Therefore, in order to characterize the conduct
-to decide whether it should be treated under a per se rule-lower courts
have examined many of the same factors relevant under rule of reason
analysis. 44 For example, courts often consider the relationship between the
agreeing parties. The per se rule applies particularly, if not exclusively, to
5
Courts
group boycotts where the parties to the agreement are competitors.
also consider the nature of the refusal; significantly different treatment has
been given to boycotts in a commercial setting than to those which seek to
achieve social or political goals, or those which are incident to a labor
dispute. Even within the commercial boycott setting, determination of
whether to treat the conduct as within the per se rubric depends upon
whether the intent of the parties is exclusionary-designed to injure or
discipline the object of the boycott-or whether the conduct is designed to
achieve other purposes which are neutral or even beneficial.
There have been scores of cases in the two decades since the Klor's
decision which have reiterated that concerted refusals to deal are illegal per
se. A smaller group of lower court decisions, however, while not disputing
the basic per se nature of the group boycott doctrine, have refused to apply
the rule to the particular facts at bar. In other words, these courts have
determined particular situations not to be group boycotts so that the
Fashion Guild/Klor's line of cases can be distinguished. A number of
rationales have been used to find that the challenged conduct did not fall
within the per se rubric. Lower courts have looked to the defendant's lack

in response, the plaintiff argued that the defendants had engaged in a "concerted refusal to
deal." The court, influenced by the fact that the defendants had decided to go out of
business, held that the conduct should not be classified as a group boycott. The Court distinguished Fashion Guild and Klors because they each involved "joint refusals to deal by
viable business entities which deliberately and intentionally refused to deal with a trader
although otherwise able." Id. at 241. See also Instant Delivery Corp. v. City Stores Co., 284
F. Supp. 941, 947 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
44. Under the rule of reason analysis, a court determines the reasonableness of any
restraint, and hence the legality of the conduct, by considering:
the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable[,] [tlhe history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end sought to be
attained ....
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (Brandeis, J.).
The Supreme Court explained the per se approach's methodology recently in National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-96 (1978). If the conduct
falls within the rule of reason, a court will be allowed to weigh arguments about the
competitive effects of the arrangement. On the other hand, once the conduct is brought within
the per se rule, it is conclusively presumed that there will be a net adverse impact on competition. However, the per se rule does not foreclose inquiry as to the nature and effect of
the restraint until the conduct has been characterized.
45. See notes 114-34 and accompanying text infra. A distinction can be drawn among (1)
situations in which parties to the agreement are competitors, in which case the conduct is
referred to as horizontal, (2) situations in which the parties are in an actual or potential
buyer-seller relationship, in which case the conduct is referred to as vertical, and (3)
situations where the parties have a different, more distant relationship.
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of exclusionary intent, 46 to a reasonable economic need and justification for
the conduct, 47 or to a non-commercial setting for the restraint,4 8 to justify
rule of reason analysis. In fact, several lower courts have held that the per
se rule applies only to certain group boycotts,49 even though Supreme Court
decisions do not contain any such limitations.
The next section of this Article will examine the policies underlying
application of per se rules, and will conclude that, in view of the apparent
confusion that the Klor's rule has engendered, such a broad per se rule
should not apply to group boycotts. The final section will propose that
certain group boycotts be treated under the rule of reason, and will suggest
guidelines for determining when the per se rule should continue to apply.
IX.

A.

PER SE RULES: LIMITING THE RANGE OF FLEXIBILITY

Per Se Approach or Rule of Reason: The Arguments

Regardless of the specific conduct in question, numerous arguments
support either a per se approach or a rule of reason approach to evaluation
of the legality of a defendant's activities under section 1 of the Sherman

Act.50

The courts have determined that certain classes of conduct are to

be evaluated under a per se rule, and that others are subject to rule of reason
analysis.5 1 This section of the Article will review those arguments briefly
and then discuss their specific applicability to concerted refusals to deal.
The most significant advantage of a per se approach is predictability.
Once business executives know that the proposed activity falls within the
rule, they-and lawyers counseling them-will not have to speculate on the
evaluation that a future trier of fact will make of the nature and effect of
46. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 132-33 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 946 (1978); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th
Cir. 1977); E.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467
F.2d 178, 187 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1062 (1970).
47. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Ackerman-Chillingworth
v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d 484, 490 n.7 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99
S. Ct. 872 (1979); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-20 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 127 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974). See
also Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165, 170 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966).
48. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
49. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v.
Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1978); North Am. Soccer League v.
National Football League, 465 F. Supp. 665, 672-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Hunt v. Mobil O11
Corp., 465 F. Supp. 195, 214 (S.D.N.Y 1978). See note 73 in!ra.
50. See generally Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division (pts. 1-2), 74 YAmn L... 775 (1965), 75 YALu L.J. 373 (1966); Elman,
"Petrified Opinions" and Competitive Realities, 66 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 625 (1966); Loevinger,
The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law, 50 V. L. Rav. 23 (1964); von Kalinowski, The Per So
Doctrine-An Emerging Philosophy of Antitrust Law, 11 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 569 (1964).
51. See notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
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the conduct. Instead, there is the assurance of knowing that it is not worthwhile even attempting the conduct, in the hope of justifying it afterwards.
A per se approach also results in a higher level of deterrence by
widening the scope of the forbidden. Knowing that the conduct is always
prohibited, the company will hesitate to engage even in conduct closely
resembling it, since the penalties for erring are severe. Certain conduct
which the law would like to deter, but which might go unchallenged or be
enjoined only after several years, would simply not be undertaken.
The per se approach also has substantial administrative advantages. If
the legality of particular conduct is subject to individual and varying appraisals of its history, purpose, nature, and effect, the trier of fact will have
to permit introduction of, and analyze, a large volume of evidence. The
plaintiff-either an enforcement agency or a person asserting a private
cause of action-will have to go to great trouble and expense to amass that
evidence. If, instead, the plaintiff's burden of proof is satisfied simply by
showing that the proscribed conduct did occur, there will be substantial
52
savings of time and money to the parties and the courts.
Finally, allowing cases to go to the trier of fact may mean that
occasional "wrong" decisions will occur. Use of a per se approach tlius
decreases the possibility that some judges or juries will approve of conduct
which should have been condemned.
These advantages must be balanced against the serious costs which can
result from overly broad per se rules. Although a per se rule might offer
predictability, there is no advantage to society in proscribing business
conduct which is harmless or even beneficial. The advantage of a flexible
rule is that it will effectively proscribe only harmful conduct, leaving other
conduct untouched. Therefore, a per se rule should not foreclose any
activity which carries a reasonable likelihood that it will have no adverse
effect on competition.
Indeed, the statement of the justification for particular per se rules
takes this approach. They are said to be appropriate, and have been
adopted, only in those situations where experience has shown that one so
rarely expects any benefit to competition that it is not worth pursuing the
inquiry to identify the few neutral or beneficial situations which might
arise. 53 The growth in the number of categories of conduct falling within
52. As a variation to this rationale, courts have recognized that their ability to make
the economic determinations involved in weighing the impact on competition of certain forms
of conduct is limited. In the words of Justice Marshall, courts are reluctant to "ramble
through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach." United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10 n.10 (1972).
53. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958): "[.T]here are
certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
50 n.16 (1977); United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969)
(Marshall, I., dissenting).
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the per se rules is said to be based on increased experience by the courts
with that conduct. In the first few decades of antitrust enforcement, a rule
of reason inquiry was undertaken. Only in light of several cases reaching
a uniform conclusion was it deemed appropriate to foreclose this obviously
futile inquiry in future similar situations.
In its statements that per se rules are justified after experience has
shown the very small probability that the conduct will on balance be procompetitive, the Court could hardly mean that there has been empirical
evidence to justify the ban. The Court can at best mean that the several
cases where that conduct has been presented all resulted in a conclusion
that the conduct was unreasonable; analysis and intuition suggest that no
future conduct is likely to have sufficiently novel characteristics that the
ultimate conclusion would differ. Since it is unlikely that such a per se rule
would proscribe neutral or beneficial conduct, and in view of the substantial
benefits described above of a per se approach, the foreshortening of the
analysis is justified.
B. Group Boycotts: The Evil Justifying Per Se Treatment
For the past several decades, the Supreme Court has held that group
boycotts, or concerted refusals to deal, are unlawful per se. 4 It has held
equally clearly that a unilateral refusal to deal is not proscribed by the
Sherman Act.e5 Unless it is attempting to create or maintain a monopoly,"0
a company, acting alone, can refuse to sell to anyone else. It does not
matter that the company is trying to coerce its customers to adhere to a
certain kind of conduct-for example, the maintenance by the customer of
a suggested resale price-and is using the threat of refusal of future sales as
the bargaining chip.57 Similarly, a company may lawfully attempt to get its
supplier to refuse to sell to the company's competitors, and use its buying
power as the threat to accomplish this cutoff, although the result of the
threat might be that the company's rivals will be driven out of business.58
One explanation for this rule is that simple unilateral threats do not
fall within the statutory language of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which
54. See notes 12-33 and accompanying text supra.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 612 (1914).
56. If the defendant's conduct is actuated by a specific intent to achieve a monopoly
in a particular market, and there is a dangerous probability that the refusal to deal will allow
it to obtain that monopoly, this unilateral conduct may be unlawful under § 2 of the Sherman
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366
(1973); Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464 (1962); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
57. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). But see United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). See generally Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the
Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 847 (1955).
58. FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565 (1924); Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See also Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); text accompanying
notes 129-33 infra.
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requires a "contract, combination..,

or conspiracy." 59

Another explana-

tion is the somewhat hallowed notion that a company, acting unilaterally, has
some "natural freedom" to choose whether it will sell to, or buy from, some-

one else.60

But these rationales, taken alone, hardly explain why the

unilateral refusal to deal appears to be "per se lawful," while the concerted

refusal to deal is, to the contrary, per se unlawful.
The Court inched towards an explanation of this different treatment in

Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States 0 1 when it pointed to the
added coercive power that was obtained when a company, in a business
dispute with its customers, enrolled the market power of its competitors so
as to achieve a result which it might not be able to achieve were it acting
alone and thus relying only on its own market power.0 2 Somehow, the
escalation of a bilateral dispute into the threat of an industry-wide boycott
transformed the lawful into the condemned. 3 Yet, the use of joint market
power by two competitors, even if it has injurious effects on others, is not
in itself unlawful. When two rivals merge to form a new, bigger company,
they are entering into a "contract, combination

. . .

or conspiracy" which

may adversely affect their competitors. Indeed, the merged company may
be strong enough-because of its new market power-to force rivals to
conform to a certain type of conduct or go out of business. Most horizontal
mergers are nonetheless permitted, because they may result in efficiencies
which yield lower prices, better and cheaper goods or services, and increased
consumer utility. 4 In order to justify the per se rule there must not only
59. Section 1 of the Sherman Act is implicated only when there is a plurality of actors.
This jurisdictional requirement, which is reflected in the proscription of a "contract, combination, . . . or conspiracy," is sometimes replaced by the near-synonym "agreement." The
agreement may be implied as well as express, may be covert as well as overt, and may be
inferred from circumstances or observed from explicit and clear evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1966); Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
60. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919). This explanation is
supported by a provision in the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act: "[N]othing
herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise
in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint
of trade." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
61. 282 U.S. 30 (1930); see notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
62. The evil in Paramount may have been that the companies had agreed, in advance,
to refuse to do business with exhibitors, thereby foreclosing an independent investigation by
each competitor of the, merits of the original underlying dispute. Each producer-distributor
would be barred from doing business with the exhibitor, even if it thought that its competitor's
demands were unjustified. Instead, the joint refusal to license motion pictures had the effect
of making the exhibitor submit to the distributor's demand even when it felt that its position
was correct. See also United States v. First Natl Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930). See also
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543-46 (1978).
63. One particularly troubling characteristic of some concerted conduct is that the refusal
to deal may be the subject of extensive rules, making the defendants a "private government."
Thus, in Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 462-63, 465
(1941), the defendants employed "[a]n elaborate system of trial and appellate tribunals ... ,
for the determination of whether a given garment is in fact a copy of a Guild member's
design." This was found to constitute "an extra-governmental agency, which . . . provides
extra-judicial tribunals for determination and punishment of violations, and thus 'trenches
'"
See also Associated Press v. United
upon the power of the national legislature ....
States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
64. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (interpreting § 7
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
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be an evil-for example, the use of joint market power-but also the
absence of probable competitive benefit which would justify the conduct.
One key aspect of the analysis, then, is whether concerted refusals to deal
might be believed never to result in these kinds of benefits to competition. 5
If so, the suspected injury would be less willingly tolerated.
The fact that concerted refusals to deal involve a combination of market
power does not in itself indicate the effect-the exact injury-caused by the
practice. As noted, group boycotts result in the inability of some members
of the commercial community to buy from, or sell to, others-either absolutely or only in conformity with certain conditions. Since the antitrust
laws tolerate unilateral refusals to deal, however, the concerted effort must
be condemned not only because we object to the use of cooperative market
power, but also because the effect of the boycott is sufficiently objectionable.
Obviously, a group boycott can either drive competitors completely
from the market or make it significantly more difficult for them to compete.
It is a basic premise of antitrust jurisprudence that the vigor of competition
is directly linked to the number of competitors. The antitrust laws ought
at least view critically, even if they do not always condemn, activities which
might tighten any existing oligopoly. The Supreme Court has stated its
preference for an economy characterized by deconcentration-many companies, each with a small share of the market-and freedom of entry and
exit. Thus, even if the victim's market is rather deconcentrated, a course
of conduct by some businesses which drives another from the market is
undesirable. 66 Under this view, the Sherman Act is designed to protect
firms from those forms of "unfair practices" which will drive them from the
market.r The phrase "unfair" covers a world of sins, and depends heavily
on the antitrust philosophy of the definer; nonetheless, it is reasonable to
condemn exclusionary practices unless there is another value furthered by
allowing them to continue 68 or unless they yield other competitive benefits.
Even if the boycotted party is not eliminated or diminished as a market
force, the concerted refusal to deal may deprive the firm of entrepreneurial
freedom and force it to conform to conduct-such as pricing, selection of
goods sold, choice of suppliers or customers-which is arbitrarily determined
by another. Absent the boycott, a company might bring new products on
the market, sell through new distributive channels or to different customers,
offer new services to consumers, or package the product differently. The
concerted refusal to deal deprives the businessman of this flexibility, and
65. There are, however, certainly situations presenting such efficiencies. For example, in
Associated Press v. United States, the parties to a joint venture refused to sell news to nonmembers. It might be argued that this restriction was initially required to induce the investment of venture capital, and continued to be required to promote the efficient distribution
of the product among the joint venturers. The per se rule apparently would foreclose all
assertions of even these limited efficiencies as a defense to a concerted refusal to deal.
66. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
67. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). See also United
States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
68. See, e.g., text accompanying note 60 supra.
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may therefore rob society of lower prices, better quality products and services, and ultimately of goods themselves. In view of these potential
exclusionary effects, and bearing in mind the general advantages of the per
se approach described above, the courts may reasonably require some competitive benefits from group boycotts before permitting this conduct.
Three different potential justifications for permitting group boycotts
can be identified. (1) There is a compelling need in the industry for this
conduct; elimination of some competition is required in order for the industry
to operate efficiently. (2) Although there are admittedly no benefits to competition from the group boycott, there are other societal benefits from the
restraint and only minimal competitive injuries. (3) The particular restraint,
while admittedly not yielding any competitive benefits, also does not injure
competition; it is "neutral" conduct about which the antitrust laws should
be unconcerned.
The first possible justification-the compelling need argument-has
had a mixed reception in the courts. With regard to price-fixing, the assertion
that there is too much competition in an industry, and that therefore pricefixing is needed by the industry members to protect themselves and ultimately the public, has been flatly rejected.6 9 That the result should be the
same with concerted refusals to deal is not clear.
In Fashion Originators'Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC,70 the defendants
argued that they were forced to resort to concerted refusals to deal in order
to eliminate a form of unfair competition; they asserted that they were being
victimized by persons copying their designs, for which there was inadequate
relief under state tort law. The Court rejected their argument, simply
asserting that the antitrust laws do not permit the elimination of competition in order to destroy other competitors. In at least certain areas, however, conduct which diminishes competition may be permitted if the courts
are sympathetic to the industry needs. The clearest examples arise in professional sports cases. For example, although football teams compete in
certain respects-both on and off the field-they may be permitted to impose upon each other restraints on the right to bid competitively for the
services of graduating college players, 71 or to negotiate with the players of
the other teams. 72 Thus, the National Football League (NFL) uses a "draft
system," assigning the rights to negotiate with graduating collegiate stars to
individual teams. The other League members have agreed in advance that
they will not compete for that player's services (they concertedly refuse to
69. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-22 (1940); United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). But see
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
70. 312 U.S. 457 (1941). See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
71. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (draft of collegiate
players is not a concerted refusal to deal subject to the Klor's per se rule; however, the draft
is an unreasonable restraint of trade).
72. Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 618-22 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977) ("Rozelle rule" not unlawful per se, but unlawful under rule
of reason).
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deal with him), forcing the player to negotiate with one team or forego
playing in the League altogether. 73 Similarly, the NFL has adopted the
so-called "Rozelle rule," which allows the NFL Commissioner to require a
team acquiring a free agent from another team to compensate that player's
former team. The result of this rule is to eliminate the interest of some
teams in the services of some players; indeed, sometimes the effect will be
that all teams jointly refuse to deal with the free agent. Nonetheless, it
need not follow that the draft system or the Rozelle rule must be labeled
per se unlawful. The courts may recognize that unbridled competition in
that industry would be destructive, and that certain agreements by com74
petitors not to do business with third parties may occasionally be necessary.
73. The court in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
sought to avoid the Kor's rule by stating that it only applied to "a concerted attempt by
a group of competitors at one level to protect themselves from competition from nongroup members who seek to compete at that level." Id. at 1178. Support for this approach
was found in Professor Sullivan's treatise. He argued that "the per se rule applies only to
classic boycotts," which he then defined as "an effort by a group of traders to exclude or
inhibit a competitor trying to enter or compete in their market either by themselves not dealing
with the competitor or by coercing or inducing one or more suppliers or customers not to
deal with him." L. SuLLWvAN, supra note 5, at 255 n.5. See also id. at 259. The court in
Smith then observed that "the NFL clubs . . . are not competitors in any economic sense."
593 F.2d at 1178-79 (emphasis in original).
This analysis is flawed on two counts. First, although the court observed that, unlike
the normal business situation, no football team wants to drive another team out of business,
the clubs nonetheless engage in very vigorous competition in scouting out the best players
and bidding for their services. Absent the draft rule, the teams would bid up the prices
for player services-the very essence of competition; the draft rule eliminates that price
competition by denying potential alternate employers to the drafted player. Indeed, in the
section of the opinion evaluating the draft under the rule of reason, the court focused on this
anticompetitive effect as the basis for finding it unlawful. Id. at 1183-89. Second, Kor's itself
does not fit within the facts of the court's reformulation of an illegal concerted refusal to deal.
There, the manufacturer-conspirators were not seeking to "protect themselves from competition
from non-group members"; the object of the boycott was a buyer from those defendants,
who apparently was being disciplined for engaging in price cutting. See note 118 and accompanying text infra. Therefore, Professor Sullivan's proposed limitation on Kior's may not
accurately reflect the present law.
The Smith decision points out the difficulties courts experience with the present per so rule.
In addition to resorting to characterization-saying that this conduct was not a group boycott
within the meaning of Klor's-the court also noted that there is authority for recognizing
"two types of group boycotts-'per se boycotts' and 'rule of reason boycotts.'" 593 F.2d at
1179 n.22. Until Klor's is modified by the Supreme Court, it is inappropriate for lower
courts to disregard its rather clear statement of the per so rule. Rather, the courts will
have to continue to struggle with the characterization approach. This nonetheless indicates the
need for Supreme Court clarification of the scope of the rule.
74. An interesting example of the recognition by a court of the occasional need of
industry members to resort to a group boycott for self-protection is Florists' Nationwide Tel.
Delivery Network v. Florists Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
387 U.S. 909 (1967). The defendant association (FTD) consisted of a nationwide network
of florists, the objective of which was to allow a retail customer to place an order for flowers
in one city, for delivery by an association member florist in another city. The plaintiff
organized a sub-group of that association, made up of a maximum of one florist in each city
who was designated as a "selected" member of FTD. The members of this sub-association
then hoped that each would channel its order in another city to another member, rather than
having the remote florist chosen at random. Nonmembers of the plaintiff's association complained that they were losing business. In response to these complaints, the defendant
adopted new rules which prohibited its members from joining organizations like the plaintiff's; membership in the plaintiff's organization fell off drastically. The plaintiff charged
that the new by-laws resulted in a group boycott of his service and of the members of the
association.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, despite the trial court's instructions that
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Rather than resort to the per se approach, the courts have used the rule
of reason to determine if there is a less restrictive alternative that can

achieve that goal. 75
Examples of the second possible justification for group boycotts-other

societal benefits-are frequently, though not always, found in situations
where the alleged refusal to deal, although in a commercial setting, is

designed to achieve non-commercial (or non-economic) goals.

Thus, in

Radiant Burners,76 the defendants were accused of acting in concert to

prevent the sale and use of the plaintiff's gas burner. Although it is true
that absent the defendants' conduct there would have been an additional
product on the market, resulting in increased competition for sales in that
industry, there would have been great societal injury if the burner had been
unsafe. The remand of the case for trial, rather than directing entry of

judgment for plaintiff because of defendants' admitted refusal to certify the
plaintiff's product, indicates the Court's belief that the loss of competition

might be more than offset by the protection of the public.
This kind of analysis is admittedly inconsistent with the per se approach, at least as regards price-fixing. In National Society of'Professional
Engineers v. United States,77 the Court rejected out of hand the same
there must be a finding that the by-laws "were adopted and published with specific intent to
destroy plaintiff's business." Id. at 269. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, distinguishing Supreme Court cases supporting a per se rule on their facts, held that
the defendant'.s conduct was lawful. The court found that the defendant had merely been
reacting to what it characterized as the plaintiff's "deceptive activities." Id. at 270.
This holding seems inconsistent with Fashion Guild. There, the Supreme Court had assumed
that the conduct of the "style pirates" not only was unfair, but perhaps even tortious. The
Court nonetheless held that concerted refusals to deal with others, with the knowledge and
intent that they might be driven out of business as a result, were unreasonable without more:
"[E]ven if copying were an acknowledged tort under the law of every state, that situation
would not justify petitioners in combining together to regulate and restrain interstate commerce in violation of federal law." 312 U.S. at 468. If the per se rule were applied, the
alleged justification of defendant FTD-"that the FD rules complained of are but reasonable
methods of self-protection against such boycott and unfair and deceptive advertising practices
on the part of [defendant]," 371 F.2d at 267-should be equally irrelevant and unavailing.
75. Restrictive agreements involving professional sports groups have been the subject of
several challenges under the concerted refusal to deal theory. In addition to the Smith and
Mackey decisions discussed in notes 71-73 and accompanying text supra, see, e.g., Neeld v.
National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1979); Deesen v. Professional Golfers'
Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); North Am.
Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F. Supp. 665, 672-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Kapp v. National
Football League, 390 F. Supp. 73, 80-81, 88-89 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Philadelphia World Hockey
Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 504, 518 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
The antitrust problems of professional and collegiate athletes-with frequent emphasis
on concerted refusals to deal-have been the subject of some concern by student law review
authors. See, e.g., Comment, National Football League Restrictions on Competitive Bidding
for Players' Services, 24 BuFFALo L. REv. 613 (1975); Note, The Super Bowl and the
Sherman Act: Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws, 81 HARV. L. REv. 418
(1967); Comment, Player Control Mechanisms in Professional Team Sports, 34 U. PrrT. L.
REv. 645 (1973); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YA E L.J.
655 (1978); 9 CONN. L. REv. 336 (1977); 7 Cum. L. REv. 505 (1977); 15 DuQ. L. REv. 747
(1977); 59 MARQ. L. REv. 632 (1976); 55 NEe. L. REv. 335 (1976).
76. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
77. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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sort of argument-that price-fixing which might result in higher fees for
engineers was justified by concerns for public safety, in that cost-cutting
engineers might design unsafe buildings or bridges. The Court held that
the Sherman Act had already made the judgment that competition was the
predominant value; the only proper inquiry would be whether the injury to
competition from the restraint was offset by some benefit to competition in
another form. Unlike the price-fixing situation, however, the justification of
societal benefit appears not completely foreclosed when the conduct in
question is a group boycott.
The third potential exception from the per se rule governing concerted
refusals to deal concerns those forms of conduct which are neutral, in that
they have no significant effect either way on competition. The very existence
of this category seems to be inconsistent with the basic philosophy of the
per se approach, which posits that all group boycotts injure competition.
Yet' the lower courts have recognized some group boycotts about which the
antitrust laws can be unconcerned.
The most common situations falling in this third category are boycotts
in a non-commercial setting, that is, either where the defendants are not
businessmen or where their objective in implementing the challenged activity
is not to make a profit.7 8 It is true that even a "non-commercial" boycott
-a refusal to buy from or sell to another-will have some effect on competition, at least in the microeconomic sense. Assume that a political organization, in an effort to achieve some goal, urges its members not to
patronize stores until the store owners comply with the group's demands.
There will indeed be some impact on competition-the boycotted stores
will sell less, while the non-boycotted stores will have less competition and
will sell more goods or will raise prices and profit levels. Nonetheless,
most courts have looked at the intent, or purpose, of the boycotting parties
and, if a non-commercial motive has been discerned, have found the
conduct lawful under the Sherman Act. 79 The rationale is as follows: an
effect on competition will result from any decision respecting what and from
whom one will buy or sell; where the effect, however, is incidental or ancillary to the non-commercial conduct, it may be characterized as not
"affecting" competition within the meaning of the antitrust laws.
Although there is authority for distinguishing commercial and noncommercial restraints, this analysis is too simplistic. 80 It does not make
the critical distinction between conduct which is designed to have, and will
probably have, the condemned evil effect on competition and conduct not
motivated by the requisite intent or having such an effect.

78. See Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal,
1970 DUKE L. J.247, 249.
79. See note 102 infra.
80. See text accompanying note 102 inlra.
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III.
A.

PROPOSED REFORMULATION OF THE RULE

Introduction-The Need for a New Synthesis of the Rule

In general, courts have sanctioned per se rules when experience has
shown that the conduct is so likely to have net anticompetitive effects that
it is not worth expending judicial and law-enforcement resources to identify
the occasional procompetitive instances of the conduct. The Supreme
Court's experience with group boycotts, however, has not been sufficient

to justify institution of a per se rule. The present breadth of the per se
rule can be explained in part by the concerted refusals to deal actually encountered in the Supreme Court decisions. In all of those cases, the allegations or evidence was that the conduct was designed for purely economic
reasons-to coerce the object of the boycott to conform to a certain type
of conduct, and perhaps even to drive it out of business. Furthermore, the
only probable effect was the elimination of a form of competition. 8'
The labeling of concerted refusals to deal as per se unlawful creates a
number of problems. First, because the Supreme Court has never defined
with care the conduct to be covered, the rule is naturally subject to varying
interpretations by lower courts. Second, even if the conduct covered by the
rule were defined more precisely, parties and the courts would disagree about

the exact nature and effect of the conduct in question.82 Examinations of

81. In Fashion Guild, the defendants frankly admitted that they sought to drive the
"style pirates" out of business. 312 U.S. at 461. In Klor's, the defendants admitted that the
result of their conduct might be to drive the plaintiff out of business; they defended in part
on the ground that there were hundreds of similar merchants in town, and competition would
not be injured even if the plaintiff were forced from the scene. 359 U.S. at 209-10. The
effect of defendants' conduct might have been minimal, but it was clearly anticompetitive,
and if freely repeated would have had a serious impact in the long run. In General Motors,
the auto dealers were upset that some of their competitors were selling to discount houses;
they urged their supplier to use the threat of a refusal to deal to coerce those competitors
into refraining from that business practice. 384 U.S. at 127. The effect was to deny to
consumers an alternative source of the product and to enhance its price.
82. Professor Sullivan resorts to a variation of the characterization approach to solve
the problem of an overinclusive rule by creating two forms of boycotts. The first, the
"explicit boycott," is "one in which the perpetrators agree not to deal with the victims or
request (or demand that) others not deal with the victims." L. SusLvAN, supra note 5, at
241 n.l. In contrast "are situations where firms at one level take joint action ... which may
have the foreseeable but indirect effect of inducing others not to deal with one or more of
the competitors of the firms which took the joint action." Id. Sullivan apparently would
treat explicit boycotts as unlawful per se, while the second (unnamed) category would
receive rule of reason treatment. Id. at 244 & n.9, 252.
There are two important problems with this approach. First, making application of the
per se rule turn on whether an effect is direct or indirect provides no firm guidance to the
lower courts, which will then be submerged in such needless preliminary determinations as
foreseeability and proximate cause. Second, the direct-indirect distinction gives insufficient
emphasis to the defendants' purposes in engaging in the arrangement or the extent of the
adverse effect of the restraint on competition. As indicated below, see notes 89-110 and
accompanying text infra, these should be the principal focuses of any analysis of concerted
refusals to deal.
Professor Bork takes a somewhat different approach. "[A]nalysis indicates that per se
illegality should be reserved for naked boycotts, those not accompanying a lawful joint
economic endeavor. When a boycott is found in the context of lawful joint economic
behavior, it is not automatically lawful, for the law must still be satisfied that the restraint
is aimed at creating efficiency rather than destroying or coercing rivals by means that do not
benefit consumers. Boycotts that enhance efficiency may be called ancillary, while those that
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justifications for the conduct are therefore permitted at the back door just
when the front door seems to have been barred.
Finally, in recent years the Court has created two different categories
of per se rules. One-the "pure!' rule-provides that the conduct (once
identified) is always forbidden, regardless of any other factors. Price-fixing
is the clearest example of this approach. On the other hand, the "modified"
per se rule applies only after certain preconditions are met. Thus, tying
arrangements are not always unlawful; they become unlawful per se only
when the defendant has "sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the
tied product and a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce is
affected." 83 Similarly, there has been some suggestion that the exchange
of price information among competitors should be deemed price-fixing, and
hence per se illegal, only if the defendants have a substantial share of the
market. 84 Although the Supreme Court has never suggested that group
boycotts should be handled under a modified per se rule, some lower court
decisions suggest that such a rule does in fact exist. 5
It seems clear that a serious reexamination of the nature and scope of
the rule regarding group boycotts is appropriate. The first step in this reevaluation must be an explicit statement from the Supreme Court of why
(or whether) group boycotts are deserving of per se treatment. Although
the Court in Fashion Guild facilely compared the effect of group boycotts
to that of price-fixing, 86 there has simply never been an analysis of the
universal evils of group boycotts. Once the Court has explained why at
least certain types of group boycotts always have this anticompetitive effect,
it must define-carefully and specifically-the conduct which is within the
forbidden category. All other conduct should be evaluated under the rule
of reason. The preceding discussion contains some explanation of why at
least some concerted refusals to deal may be sufficiently universally anticompetitive as to be deserving of per se treatment, 7 and also of why a
accompany a joint endeavor but are actually predatory may be called disguised naked
boycotts." R. BoRK, THE ANTITRUsT PARADox 334 (1978). This approach is characteristic
of Professor Bork, who would measure all conduct in terms of advancement of allocativo
efficiency or consumer welfare. See, e.g., id. at 7-9, 50-56. But this single-minded approach
fails to recognize that efficiency and injury to competitors are not polar positions.
Professor Bork criticizes the Court in Fashion Guild for its failure to consider the
possibility that the defendants "were seeking to obtain the advertising and promotional advantages that exclusive dealing confers, and such an object ought not to be illegal." Id. at
339. It is also clear, however, that those defendants were attempting to achieve these
efficiencies by a system intended to drive competitors from the market. Thus, Professor Bork's
test either is of dubious guidance for future decisions, or worse, would permit some obviously
coercive and anticompetitive kinds of conduct.
83. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
84. M. HANDLER, H. BLARE,

R.

PrToFsKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON

TRADE REGULATION 333 (1975).
85. See, e.g., Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1978); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 nn.24 & 25 (D.C. Cir.
1978); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F. Supp. 665, 673-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
86. See 312 U.S. at 468.
87. See notes 62-68 and accompanying text supra.
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sweeping per se rule covers too much.8 8 This section of the Article will
therefore suggest a formulation of the definition the Court should use to
differentiate between the two categories.
B.

Guidelines for a New Rule
Courts should apply a per se rule to group boycotts only when two

conditions are met: first, the conduct must be intended to coerce or exclude

other entrepreneurs; second, the conduct must be likely to have anticompetifive effects. A third factor-the defendant's market power-may bear on the
purpose of a concerted refusal to deal and its likely effect; courts should be
less disposed to apply the per se rule where the defendant's share of the

market is small.
Unless both of these conditions are met, the court should apply the

rule of reason. Situations in which concerted refusals to deal are not likely
to meet these conditions can be divided into four broad categories: those
in which the conduct is intended to protect the public from injurious activities; those that are intended to further political, social, or moral goals;
those that are essential to efficient operation of the industry; and those in
which economic benefits are realized. If conduct falls within one of these
categories, it should be evaluated under the rule of reason. If not, the per se
rule should continue to apply.
The factors that may determine whether a rule of reason should apply-

the significance of the defendants' intent, the effect of the restraint, and the
defendants' market power-will be considered in turn. In addition, it will
be necessary to examine another factor to which the courts have given much
attention-the relationship between the parties. An analysis of several cases

will indicate that undue reliance on this factor can lead to unjust results.
88. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text supra.
An excellent example of an overly broad definition of a concerted refusal to deal is
Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Miller-Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 828 (1970). The defendant, a general contractor, had been invited to bid on a large
construction project. The plaintiff, an electrical subcontractor, submitted to defendant a
quotation for a portion of the project. The defendant told the plaintiff that its quotation
was the lowest it received, and gave assurances that if it received the main bid, it would
give the electrical job to the plaintiff; in return, the plaintiff agreed to submit padded high
bids to the other general contractors. Although the defendant did receive the general
contract, it then awarded the electrical subcontract to one of the plaintiff's competitors. The
court held that "[o]n the basis of these pleadings the agreement between [defendant] and
[plaintiff] constitutes a per se violation of the Sherman Act. By preventing [plaintiff] from
submitting bids to other general contractors at the same prices made available to [defendant],
the agreement constitutes a concerted refusal to deal." Id. at 1137.
This approach elevates an action for breach of contract, or for slick business dealings,
into a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiff was not the object or victim of
the boycott, but rather a party thereto. Furthermore, this purely vertical agreement would
have had the effect of coercing or excluding other general contractors only if one assumes
that there were no other electrical contractors who would be able to quote equally low
prices; that is, if the plaintiff had substantial market power. Finally, the agreement could
have been viewed simply as a restraint ancillary to an otherwise proper agreement to choose
a supplier of subcontracting services. See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng.
Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). The agreement not to supply competitive bids to the defendant's
competitors should at best have been viewed as nothing more than partial consideration for
the contract, and at worst, as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
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Finally, this section will discuss other factors which merit consideration once
a court has determined that the rule of reason applies.
1. Defendants Intent. The beneficent motives proffered by most companies regarding conduct which might injure competition are always suspect;
we simply do not expect businesses to-be run as charitable institutions.
Businesses are centers for the making of profits, and conduct is not anticipated which would run counter to this goal. It is obvious, however, that
the fact that a company engages in conduct because of economic motivations
does not mandate the proscription of those activities. The antitrust laws
outlaw only conduct which is unfair or anticompetitive; section 1 of the
Sherman Act proscribes only concerted action which results in an unreasonable restraint of trade. The courts must operate in the context of "objective
intent," i.e., what a reasonable observer would infer as the purpose of the
conduct in question, even though it may not be the justification offered by
the defendants. For example, companies engaging in a price-fixing scheme
may argue that their plan is designed to make competition fairer or more
open, or to protect competitors from the predatory practices of others.
Courts have never felt bound to accept these rationales.89 The defendants
will be said to have intended the reasonably probable effects of their conduct, even if they did not actually expect those results. 90
There are, of course, countless examples of business activity, actuated
by a profit-making motive, which are not remotely within the interest of the
antitrust laws. 91 The rule of reason or the balancing of competitive effects
required by sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act 92 are a recognition that
those forms of conduct which yield efficiencies in production or distribution
of goods or services are often lawful even if competitors may be injured in
the process. Similarly, in evaluating a concerted refusal to deal, courts
should determine whether the defendants are seeking legitimate efficiencies
or other societal benefits or are merely seeking to coerce or exclude competitors without any countervailing economic benefit. Finally, the doctrine
should recognize conduct motivated principally by non-economic interests.
Although we do not expect companies to be altruistic or public spirited for
those reasons alone, there should be no objection to conduct, even in the
form of a concerted refusal to deal, which is intended to promote the safety
or welfare of the public, does not unnecessarily harm competitors, and may
also have incidental benefits to the parties involved.93 The rule of reason
89. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United

States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
90. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 434-46 (1978).
91. Almost every contract that a corporation enters into is motivated by the hope that
the corporation will make money from the activity, either in the short or the long run. The
result of a contract to sell a product to a customer may be to preclude the seller's competitors from making a similar contract, and will thereby "restrain competition" in the
broadest sense of that phrase. But it is clear that to read the antitrust laws to reach such
activity would make the laws not only unenforceable but meaningless.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1976).
93. See Rabl, supra note 33, at 1172.
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should apply whenever concerted refusals to deal are motivated by a concern
for the public health or safety. 94
For example, the restraint might protect the public from injurious activities. This was the defendants' argument in Radiant Burners.9 5 The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had conspired, with anticompetitive motives,
to deprive it of the seal of approval which was necessary for successful
marketing of its product. The Court held that the plaintiff should be entitled to show that its product was as safe as those manufactured by the defendants and that the defendants conspired arbitrarily to deprive it of certification. The unstated corollary to the Court's conclusion must be that
the defendants' joint refusal to certify the plaintiff's product, or to sell gas
to others for use in that appliance, would not be unlawful under the Sherman
Act if the burners were unsafe.
Similarly, the rule of reason rather than the per se rule should apply
to the enforcement by professional groups of legitimate ethical standards
by means of sanctions which might include expulsion from the society and
loss of the professional license. If a bar association, after finding that an attorney had embezzled money from a client, were to expel that member, thereby
preventing him from continuing to act as an attorney, the effect is a "group
boycott" of that person and his elimination as a competitor for offering professional services. This conduct is not motivated by an exclusionary intent,
but rather by the desire to protect the public. Furthermore, its effect on
competition will be minimal.9 6 The mere desire to act in the public interest
would not necessarily immunize the defendants' conduct. However, these
activities should be subject to a rule of reason inquiry, rather than being
treated as if they were simply another variety of the conduct condemned in
FashionGuild and Klor's.
A second category of potentially permissible group boycotts consists
of those designed to achieve non-commercial goals.97 Non-commercial boycotts are defined as refusals to deal by organizations not characterized principally by a profit-making motive, for example, by labor unions, educational
institutions, or social or political organizations. When the NAACP urged
94. Cf. Union Circulation Co. v. FTC, 241 F.2d 652, 656-57 (2d Cir. 1957) (agreement
among employers not to hire competitors' former employees for one-year period, so as to
prevent employees' fraudulent practices, not illegal per se, but unlawful under rule of reason);
Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Ass'n, 261 F. Supp. 154, 159 (D. Or.
1966), affd per curiam, 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969)
(product standardization to promote quality control, which prevented plaintiR from making

sales, not illegal group boycott).

95. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). See
.notes 34 & 76 and accompanying text supra.
96. See National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-96
(1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 780-93 (1975); Bauer, Professional Activities and the Antitrust Laws, 50 NoTRE
.DA.eN LAw., 570 (1975). Accord, Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad,
586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Palmer v. Feminist
Women's Health Center, 47 U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 8, 1979) (No. 78-1689).
97. Compare Konecky v. Jewish Press, 288 F. 179 (8th Cir. 1923), with Council of
'Defense v. International Magazine Co., 267 F. 390 (8th Cir. 1920). See also Coons, NonCommercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 705 (1962).

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:685

that its supporters cease buying from certain merchants, or cease patronizing
the local bus system until seating was integrated, 8 there was admittedly a
joint refusal to do business with other parties which had adverse economic
effects on those parties. 99 Although the boycotters intended to force compliance with certain practices, and the effect of the boycotts may have been
to drive certain firms out of business, the boycotters were seeking to achieve
political or social, rather than economic, ends.100 Whether or not one agrees
with the particular goal or tactic of the boycott, notions of political and
economic freedom require that this activity be allowed. 1 1 This does not
mean, as a few cases and commentators have suggested, that a narrow exception to the per se rule should be developed to exclude non-commercial
boycotts. 10 2 Such an exception is too timid. It seems far more desirable
98. The NAACP's boycott activities have resulted in at least one litigated case asserting
that the activities violated the antitrust laws, albeit those of the state of Mississippi rather
than the Sherman Act. Claiborne Hardware Co. v. NAACP, No. 78,353 (Miss. Ch. Aug. 9,
1976), appeal docketed, No. 51,488 (Miss. Mar. 22, 1979). See Henry v. Nat'l Bank, 444
F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1019 (1972). Cf. Watch Tower Bible &
Tract Soc'y v. Dougherty, 337 Pa. 286, 11 A.2d 147 (1940) (threats by clergy and parishioners
to withdraw patronage from radio station and store controlling it unless station discharged
broadcasters allegedly making bigoted remarks failed to state claim for interference with
contractual rights); Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916)
(newspaper has no cause of action against clergy issuing pastoral letter prohibiting all
parishioners from subscribing to, reading, or writing for plaintiff), discussed in Coons, supra
note 97, at 716-19.
99. In 1963 the Birmingham, Alabama, retailers estimated that they were losing
about $750,000 per week because of the boycott of black customers and the added
loss of business of whites who were afraid to come downtown. The blacks of Macon,
Georgia, discontinued riding buses in 1962 to protest segregated seating. The bus
company, suffering a 50 percent fare loss, gave in to the demands. The Evening
Bulletin, a Philadelphia newspaper, estimated that it lost 25,000 to 50,000 subscriptions
between April 15 and June 10, 1962, due to a boycott protesting certain policies
regarding news about the black community.
Comment, The Consumer Boycott, 42 Miss. L.J. 226 (1971). See also Madison, Mississippi's
Secondary Boycott Statutes: UnconstitutionalDeprivations of the Right to Engage In Peaceful
Picketing and Boycotting, 18 How. L.J. 583 (1975); Note, Political Boycott Activity and
the First Amendment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 659 (1978).
100. The National Organization for Women has promoted a boycott of states that
have not yet ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). A principal objective is to
persuade associations not to hold meetings and conventions in nonratifying states; the hope
is that the loss of millions of dollars in revenue by business will influence legislators to vote
for ERA. In Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 289, 301-05
(W.D. Mo. 1979), the court rufused to enjoin this boycott as unlawful under § 1 of the
Sherman Act. Although the court agreed that there was a combination or conspiracy, it held
it outside the scope of the Sherman Act because of its "non-commercial" and "non-economilc"
nature. See also Nevada v. National Organization for Women, Inc., CIV-LV (D. Nev., filed
March 3, 1978).
101. The Supreme Court has recognized constitutional limitations on the scope of the
antitrust laws. For example, solicitation of governmental activity-seeking legislative change
through lobbying or seeking executive or administrative agency action-is protected, principally because of the first amendment, even if the result of the sought-after action will
harm .or even destroy competition. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
102. Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary
Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 653-54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970); Velzaga
v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 70,868, 70,869-70 (N.D. Ill.
1977); Jones v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 296-98 (D. Mass.
1975); Coons, supra note 97.
The Supreme Court cases relied on for this exception are Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469 (1940), and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7
(1959). The premise of those advocating different treatment for non-commercial boycotts

19791

GROUP BOYCOTTS

to deal with the per se rule frontally, rather than through an exception which
still leaves within its coverage other forms of neutral, benign, or even competitively beneficial conduct. Non-commercial boycotts should be treated
as one of the categories of conduct which one can predict will not always
have anticompetitive effects.
2. Effect of the Restraint. In evaluating group boycotts, courts should
examine the effect on competition of the challenged conduct, both for its
own sake and to evaluate the defendants' purposes and motives. They
should go beyond asking whether -the refusal to deal arose in a commercial
or non-commercial setting, or whether the conduct was motivated by, and
had the effect of, coercing or excluding competitors. Rather, the analysis
should include the overall effect on competition. There are several situations
in which conduct will have some effect on competition, but which should no
longer be swept within the per se rule. Two of these situations have already
been considered.10 3 Two others are considered here: situations in which a
concerted refusal to deal is necessary for efficient operation of the industry,
and those in which net economic benefits result.
Concerted refusals to deal in which coordinated conduct by competitors
regarding outsiders is essential for the efficient operation of their activities
should be dealt with under the rule of reason. For example, an association
of professional golfers may determine that a tournament cannot be run with
more than a specified number of participants. Through a series of matches,
the qualifying golfers are selected; all others are refused entry into the
tournament. 10 4 Although the successful qualifiers combine to refuse to compete against the nonqualifiers, and their motive is in part to improve their
own economic status, the courts have permitted, and should continue to
permit, these refusals to deal. The elimination of competition between the
qualifiers and nonqualifiers results in a higher quality of competition among
those who do qualify. More important, if the antitrust laws were to require
that anyone could play in any tournament, the competition would be chaotic.
This situation is most likely to occur when the parties are engaged in
some type of joint venture or where their activities involve some partial
integration of roles. 10 5 Where the court can determine that the principal
motive for adopting these limitations is to promote operational efficiency in
the industry, where such efficiency is indeed advanced, and where there is
is that the persons engaged in those kinds of refusals to deal usually are not motivated by an
exclusionary purpose, and therefore the conduct would not have a net anticompetitive effect.
They also suggest that the legislative intent behind the Sherman Act did not indicate a desire
to deal with these non-economic situations. But see Bird, supra note 78, at 275-88, 292 (per
se rule should apply even to most non-commercial group boycotts).
103. See notes 91-101 and accompanying text supra.
104. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966). See also Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564
F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Bridge Corp. of America v. American Contract Bridge League,
Inc., 428 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1970); cases cited in note 75 supra.
105. Such an argument might have been made in Associated Press v. United States, 326
U.S. 1 (1945). See note 65 supra.
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no satisfactory alternative conduct which would equally achieve those efficiencies, these restraints should not be swept within the per se rule. 100
Finally, group boycotts should not be subject to a per se rule if they
are noncoercive and nonexclusionary and will help effect net economic
benefits. This principle proceeds upon the assumption that activities should
never be subject to a per se rule unless courts can be confident that those
activities can never produce competitive efficiencies. For example, courts
can be sure that no competitive benefit will result from allowing competitors
to tamper with the price-setting mechanism, because economists have demonstrated that any price other than the one set by market forces, and without.
the interference of the defendants' restrictive conduct, is a non-equilibrium,
non-market-clearing price. 0 7 The same lack of efficiency is not necessarily
characteristic of concerted refusals to deal.
One situation in which a refusal to deal may be procompetitive was
presented in the Worthen Bank case.' 08 The national BankAmericard system, one of the two nationwide bank credit card organizations, imposed a
by-law provision on certain of its bank members prohibiting them from participating as issuers of credit cards in the Master Charge organization, the
other nationwide bank credit card organization. Worthen, a BankAmericard
system member, charged that this by-law resulted in a group boycott by all
BankAmericard members of the Master Charge organization. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that no
competitive justification could be put forward under the per se doctrine.1 00
The Eighth Circuit reversed. It agreed that the result was to preclude all
BankAmericard members subject to the by-law from doing any business with
Master Charge, but it recognized significant competitive benefits from the
arrangements. Indeed, it was stipulated by the parties that the by-law provision promoted competition and that absent the boycott it imposed, there
would be a diminution of competition between BankAmericard and Master
Charge. The court found that the joint action of the BankAmericard system
members promoted efficiency and that the exclusionary practices were necessary to make this joint venture successful. The Court distinguished the
leading group boycott cases and held that on remand the case should be
tested by the rule of reason. Such an approach makes sense. Once the
defendants' nonexclusionary motive and the net benefits to the public welfare are shown, it would be counterproductive to apply a per se rule. 10
106. See, e.g., Ackerman-Chillingworth v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 579 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 872 (1979); Hatley v. American Quarter Horse
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord, Feminist Women's Health Center,
Inc. v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3761 (May 8, 1979).
107. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 63-68, 397, 516 (10th ed. 1976).
108. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
109. Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 345 F. Supp. 1309
(E.D. Ark. 1972), rev'd, 485 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974).
110. Another example of a concerted refusal to deal mandated by practical business
considerations but resulting in economic efficiencies is suggested by Problem 13 in M.
HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PrroFsIcY & H. GoLnscmmd,
supra note 84, at 523, and ff 375 in
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Admittedly, this category is potentially large enough to swallow the
per se rule, making it meaningless. Unfortunately, it will probably be impossible to define in advance the many varieties of restraints which may fall
within it. The Court, however, should expressly recognize the existence
of this category and encourage its further explication in the lower courts.
With some additional experience, the Court should be able to define this
category more specifically.
3. Defendants' Market Power. The defendants' market power is one
indicator of the likely impact on competition of any particular restraint. Although there is no readily available method of measuring raw market power,
a surrogate frequently used is the percentage of the market controlled by
The resulting figure may be deceptive, because of difthe defendants."1
ficulties in defining the relevant market within which to ascertain the defendants' market share,'1 2 or because other factors, such as possession of -trademarks or relatively high or low capital and technological barriers to entry,
may call for a more particularistic examination. In most situations, however, it is useful to approximate the defendants' market power. Specifically,
two uses can be made of this information. First, it may prove instructive
in determining the defendants' purpose or intent in entering into the concerted action and in assessing its likely effect (especially if the plan is not
yet fully implemented) so as to determine whether the activities fall within
the per se rule. Indeed, in several group boycott decisions the Court has
pointed to the defendants' market share as an indication that they intended
to coerce the third party, or as evidence of their ability to achieve that

P. AREBDA, supra note 41, at 388. Assume that a group of insurance companies, to cut their
overhead and achieve economies of scale, delegates to an evaluation bureau the responsibility
of investigation of the background of any applicant for insurance. Although there is no
formal agreement to abide by the investigator's recommendation, as a matter of practice,
because of their reliance on its superior investigation and evaluation skills, in the past all
companies have uniformly refused to issue insurance to any applicant found by the investigator
to be an undue risk. it is clear that the net result of this pattern is to deprive an applicant
of the benefit of insurance by all the competitors who are members of the investigation group.
Assuming that this conduct could be characterized as a combination or conspiracy-and an
inference of an agreement is certainly justifiable, see Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount
Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S.
208 (1939)-the conduct would appear to be a concerted refusal by all insurance companies
to deal with that applicant. However, not only is the effect of the arrangement a great
savings in cost-both from economies of scale and from the avoidance of duplicative investigations of risk-but the motivation of the companies in entering the plan was not to coerce
the applicant to conform to certain behavior or to drive it out- of business. There might be
some argument that the applicant is entitled to some "due process" safeguards, such as a
statement of the reasons for the rejection or an investigation by a second company at the
applicant's expense after tfie negative report by the first evaluator. See Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); note 135 and accompanying text infra. There is no
reason, however, why this conduct should be treated under a per se rule. See also Ruddy
Brook Clothes, Inc. v. British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co., 195 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 816 (1952).
111. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, J191, 223-24 (1940) (defendants accounted for 83%
of gasoline sales in their areas). See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 64 & n.4, 66 & n.8 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
112. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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result." 3 However, this use of market power is probably less necessary with
group boycotts than with some other forms of conduct subject to a per se
rule, and seldom will determine the outcome of a case.
It is clear that courts should be more concerned about conduct restraining trade when engaged in by defendants with substantial market shares
than by those with relatively trivial market shares. However, with regard
to all forms of conduct deemed to be unlawful per se, the argument that
the defendants had no market power, and hence could not have had any
effect on competition, has been rejected. In view of the substantial reasons
described above in favor of per se rules, the courts simply refuse to undertake
this analysis.
In contrast, approximation of the defendants' market power is useful in determining the legality of conduct under the rule of reason. The
activities of a group of companies which account for a substantial share of
a particular market usually will have a larger impact on competition than
similar activities by firms with smaller shares. This is particularly true with
respect to group boycotts. The effect of a boycott is to foreclose either
sources of supply or potential customers to the victim; thus, the greater the
market share (and market power) of the defendants, the greater will be the
foreclosure of alternatives to the victim and the greater the impact of their
refusal to deal on competition.
4. Relationship between the Parties. A number of decisions involving concerted refusals to deal have turned upon the relationship between the
boycotting parties; that is, whether the agreement could be characterized as
at least partially horizontal or as solely vertical. This distinction has only
limited utility. When considered apart from the purpose and the effect of
the agreement, it can lead to undesirable results.
The inadequacy of the horizontal-vertical distinction is best illustrated
by an examination of four cases with similar factual settings-Klor's,Inc. v.
Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.," 4 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor

Car Co.," 5 Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 10 and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons
v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.'1 7 In all four cases, a distributor of goods
sued its former supplier or suppliers after sales to it had been terminated.
In Klor's, the plaintiff alleged that one of its competitors had approached
their common suppliers, asking them to discontinue sales to the plaintiff.
The Court found that the discussions and agreements resulted in a horizontal
conspiracy among the suppliers as well as the vertical conspiracy between
them and the competing retailer, and held the conduct unlawful per se. In
Packard, the single defendant seller agreed to discontinue sales to the plain113. Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 462 (1941); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41 (1930).
114. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
115. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
116. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), noted in 92
HARv. L. REv. 1160 (1979).
117. 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
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tiff after a competing buyer threatened to discontinue purchases from the
defendant unless it were named the exclusive distributor for the area. -Although the result of this threat and the termination of the plaintiff was to
drive it out of business and to eliminate all intrabrand competition in the
area, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held it reversible error even to let the case go to a jury; instead, a judgment for the defendant was entered.
Two facts help in part to explain the significantly different outcomes
of these two cases. Although the Supreme Court opinion in Kor's does
not mention the fact, there is some indication that the plaintiff had been
cutting prices, and -that the termination was an attempt to "discipline" this
obviously lawful conduct.118 The conspiracy, if successful, would have
diminished both intrabrand and interbrand competition. In Packard, the
defendant manufacturer was a small, struggling company facing vigorous
interbrand competition. The court may have been persuaded that the only
chance for its survival was to have one strong distributor in each geographic
area, rather than several weaker ones each attempting to take sales away
from the other. Although this concerted refusal to deal did eliminate one
form of competition (intrabrand), it might have been seen as an attempt
to promote another more important form. 1 9
In both cases the courts relied too heavily on another distinction-the
presence of both a horizontal and a vertical conspiracy among the manufacturers and the competing sellers in Kor's and the solely vertical conspiracy in Packard. Section 1 of the Sherman Act imposes the jurisdictional
requirement of plurality of conduct. 2 0 In satisfying this requirement, there
should be no difference between a combination of competitors and a combination of a supplier and a customer.' 2' Both involve two or more persons.
The key inquiries instead should be the purpose or intent of the defendants
and the effect of the restraint on competition.
In evaluating a number of forms of conduct under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the Supreme Court has emphasized the nature of the relationship between the agreeing parties. The division of territories among competitors, or the allocation of particular customers among competitors-the
horizontal restraint-is unlawful per se.12 2 On the other hand, a requirement
by a seller that its customers must restrict their resales to certain territories
or to specified buyers, and the embodiment of this requirement in an agree118. See Rahi, supra note 33, at 1172 n.22; Note, Proving Injury to Competition in
Private Antitrust Suits Provoked by Concerted Refusals to Deal, 68 YALE L.J 949, 956 &
n.45 (1959).
119. This was the Court's rationale in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Slyvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), for permitting a manufacturer to impose vertical territorial and customer
restraints on its distributors.
120. See note 59 supra.
121. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968); United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45 (1960). See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement
Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655
(1962).
122. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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ment-the vertical restraint-is dealt with under the rule of reason.128 Indeed, in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,124 which involved claims of unlawful
territorial restrictions, the Court identified what has turned out to be the
key inquiry:
Because this Court has distinguished between horizontal and vertical territorial limitations for purposes of the impact of the Sherman Act, it is first necessary to determine whether the territorial
arrangements here are to be treated as the creature of the licensor,
the product of a horizontal arrangement among the
Sealy, or 2as
5
licensees.
Yet, since the effect of either horizontal or vertical territorial restraint is
the elimination of some forms of competition, the effect of either restraint
may be identical. And, when the vertical restraint is imposed by the seller
on the buyers at their initiative and behest, the motive and purpose are the
same as well.126
Some of the flavor of the horizontal-vertical distinction has also appeared in the Supreme Court's treatment of concerted refusals to deal. Thus,
in Klor's the Court pbinted out that "[t]his is not a case of a single trader
refusing to deal with another, nor even of a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. Alleged in this complaint is a wide
combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer."1 27
restraint.
Because of this horizontal character, the Court condemned the
123
The same theme appears in later Supreme Court cases as well.
The lower federal courts have also relied on this distinction. In
Oreck,129 the plaintiff was the sole wholesale distributor of defendant Whirlpool's vacuum cleaners; it resold these products by direct mail and to janitorial supply houses. Whirlpool also sold vacuum cleaners to Sears Roebuck, a large retail merchandiser. After the plaintiff's distributorship was
terminated, it alleged that Whirlpool had acted in response to requests from
Sears, which was disturbed by the plaintiff's pricing policies. The trial
resulted in a jury verdict for the plaintiff, pursuant to the trial judge's instructions that this conduct was covered by the Klor's per se rule. The
Second Circuit, emphasizing that any conspiracy here was purely vertical,
held that the conduct should have been tested under the rule of reason.18 0
123. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
124. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
125. Id. at 352. See also Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
58 n.28 (1977).
126. See Pitofsky, supra note 8.
127. 359 U.S. at 212-13.
128. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1967); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1966).
129. Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 946 (1978).
130. 579 F.2d at 131.
Other cases in which a court refused to apply the per se rule to a concerted refusal to
deal because the relationship between the parties was vertical include Harold Friedman, Inc.
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Since one objection to group boycotts is the undesirability of the use

of joint market power by competitors--quite apart from any effect on competition from the cooperation-it is understandable that courts have dealt
more harshly with horizontal restraints. Yet Oreck indicates the problem
that may occur when the distinction becomes a key element. of the operating
rule and the court fails to examine adequately the defendants' purpose in
entering into the combination or the effect of restraint. If it could have been
shown that the manufacturers in Klor's joined in refusing to sell to the
plaintiff not because they wanted to achieve the anticompetitive purpose of
enforcing resale price maintenance, but for some procompetitive or societally
beneficial reason, it would have been inappropriate to. condemn the restraint
as unlawful per se. Similarly, if the favored distributor in Packard v. Webster had objected to the cut-off dealer not because they were both relatively
small, but because the dealer was engaging in price-cutting and the termination was an effort to discipline it,' 31 or because the favored distributor
wanted a monopoly in a thriving market,132 the court should not have
directed a verdict for the defendant. To the contrary, application of the
per se rule in that situation would seem quite appropriate. The (reck
court slighted these considerations by overemphasizing the vertical nature
of the conspiracy.133
In fact, recognition of the importance of other distinctions has appeared
in some lower court decisions. In the Hawaiian Oke case, the plaintiff was
the former distributor of the goods of two of the defendants. It alleged
that, pursuant to a request from the third defendant, the two suppliers had
agreed simultaneously to terminate the plaintiff's distributorship and to appoint the third defendant as the new distributor. The supplier-defendants
v. Thorofare Markets, Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 142 n.57 (3d Cir. 1978); Mutual Fund Investors,
Inc. v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 1977); and Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386-87 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1280 (1979). See also
Sitkin Smelting & Ref. Co. v. FMC Corp., 575 F.2d 440, 446-47 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 866 (1978).
131. See Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 364 F.2d 957, 968
(5th Cir. 1966).
132. See Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484-85
(5th Cir. 1966).
133. Upon remand in Oreck, the key issue should be defendant's intent in terminating
plaintiff as a distributor. The district court's instructions had stated that proof merely of a
conspiracy between the seller and the favored distributor sufficed for finding a per se
violation. 579 F.2d at 129, 137-38 (Mansfield, J.,dissenting). Although it is true that the
plaintiff alleged and introduced evidence of the favored distributor's wish to terminate plaintiff
because of its price-cutting activities, the defendant offered evidence that the plaintiff was an
ineffective and unresponsive dealer and was terminated for that reason. In view of this
conflict, the district court's per se approach was too broad; the instructions erroneously
deprived the jury of the opportunity to evaluate the actual motives of the defendants.
The Second Circuit in Oreck concluded that the "agreement becomes violative of § 1 of
the Sherman Act only if it is anticompetitive in purpose or effect-in sum, it must be tested
by the rule of reason." Id. at 133 (emphasis in original). However, the court reached this
conclusion only after characterizing the conduct as strictly vertical, and stressing the importance of this characterization. The purpose and effect of the restraint should be critical,
regardless of whether the relationship of the parties is at least partially horizontal or is
purely vertical. There may well be situations-such as terminations to discipline a pricecutter-which are purely vertical but are nonetheless appropriate for per se treatment.
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argued that their decisions were made independently, but the court's opinion
proceeded on the assumption that there indeed was a joint understanding to
terminate the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the court held that this horizontal
conspiracy did not constitute a group boycott unlawful per se under the
Sherman Act. The sellers had apparently become dissatisfied with the
plaintiff's performance, and had resolved to appoint another distributor. As
a matter of sound business practice, a successful distributor needed to carry
the lines of more than one manufacturer. By acting jointly to appoint the
new distributor, defendants were not seeking to coerce the plaintiff to
conform to certain business practices, nor was it their intention to drive it
out of business. Rather, they were motivated by a legitimate business interest in seeing that their new distributor was successful. A rule that a
single seller could never agree with another company, such as the prospective new customer, to change distributors is contrary to business necessities.
The court in Hawaiian Oke recognized that a horizontal agreement with a
competitor to change distributors simultaneously, when motivated by the same
business necessities, should not become illegal merely because the com134
petitors are acting cooperatively.
In short, an examination of the facts of these cases indicates that mere
labeling cannot be enough. The Court cannot simply rely on a determination of whether at least two competitors, either acting alone or in conspiracy
with their seller, have agreed to refuse to do business with another trader.
The inquiry must go beyond this characterization to a look at the nature,
history, purpose, and effect of the restraint.
5. Other Considerations. Finally, after forging a rule which will
bring some concerted refusals to deal back within the rule of reason, the
Court should consider some additional elements. Under the rule of reason,
the Court should first insist upon a showing that there were no less restrictive alternatives which could have achieved the same procompetitive effects
from the concerted activity. In addition, it should insist that the object of
the restraint be accorded some opportunity to demonstrate that the proposed
restraint is unfair or inappropriate. In Silver, 35 for example, the Court held
that the refusal, without more, of the members of the New York Stock Exchange to deal with plaintiff would be an illegal group boycott. The Court
noted that the cut-off would have been permissible if the facts showed the
plaintiff had not met the minimum qualifications for a securities dealer.
However, the Sherman Act required that, before the defendants could engage
in this concerted refusal to deal, the plaintiff be afforded procedural safe134. 416 F.2d at 74-80.
There have been numerous challenges under the antitrust laws, principally under a
concerted refusal to deal theory, by terminated dealers against their former suppliers. In
addition to the cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., Mutual Fund Investors, Inc. v. Putnam
Management Co., 553 F.2d 620, 626 (9th Cir. 1977); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522
F.2d 1242, 1253-57 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976); Bushie v. Stenocord
Corp., 460 F.2d 116, 119-20 (9th Cir. 1972); Miami Parts & Spring, Inc. v. Champion Spark
Plug Co., 364 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1966).
135. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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guards. The Deesen case 36 suggests a similar approach-before the plaintiff was suspended from the professional golf circuit, he was afforded an
opportunity to show that his golf skills had not deteriorated. Explicit imposition by the Court of a requirement of fair and reasonable dealing with
the affected third party would not only help show that the defendants did
not have an exclusionary or coercive intent in refusing to deal; it would also
be evidence that no less restrictive alternative was available to achieve the
procompetitive effects of the restraint.
CONCLUSION

The present rule making concerted refusals to deal unlawful per se was
adopted without sufficient examination of the possible justifications for that
conduct. The utility of the rule is compromised by the lack of adequate
definition of the conduct subject to the rule. The principal focuses today
are on the existence of plurality of conduct; finding some horizontal component to that agreement; noting whether the activity arose in a commercial
or non-commercial setting; and occasionally allowing some inquiry into the
motives for and the effects of the conduct to come in through the back door
as possible justifications. The rule should be restructured to make the
motivations for, and the effect of, the restraint the principal inquiry. This
would be done by first defining concerted refusals to deal broadly, as any
agreement by two or more persons -in any competitive relationship with
each other-horizontal, vertical, or otherwise-in which they refuse to deal
with third parties for whatever reason. The Court should then articulate
the situations in which these concerted refusals to deal might have anticompetitive effects. Those which are suspected almost always to have those
effects can be brought within a new, and more specifically defined, per se
rule. The rule should be drawn so as always to deem unlawful those group
boycotts where the parties intended to coerce or exclude another in order
to lessen or eliminate some form of competition. Other situations, which
might frequently be justified, should be dealt with forthrightly under a rule
of reason. The present situation, which permits the inquiry through purported exceptions from an apparently rigid Supreme Court rule, only results
13 7
in confusion and disregard for sound jurisprudence.

136. Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n of America, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966); see text accompanying note 104 supra.
137. For a fascinating example of a court's attempt to avoid the perceived harshness
of the per se approach, see Culum Elec. & Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n,
436 F. Supp. 418, 428-30 (D.S.C. 1976) (association rule requiring subcontractors to submit
bids to general contractors at least five hours before time to open general bids is reasonable
and noncoercive; subcontractor whose lower bid, offered within five-hour period, was
rejected, fails to state cause of action for concerted refusal to deal).

